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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been renewed interest in, and discussion about,
changing the current system for registering securities under the Securities
Act of 1933' ("Securities Act"). Under the current transaction-based system,
issuers must register each non-exempt public offering of securities.
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1 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. SS 77a-aa (1997)).
2 Section 5 of the Securities Act strictly prohibits all selling efforts prior to the filing of a
registration statement, absent an exemption. See 15 U.S.C. S 77(e) (1997). These prohibitions are:
[I]mplemented by regulating the scope of all offers as well as sales of securities so long as there
is sufficient use of interstate commerce unless there is an applicable exemption. The basic
purpose of [the SecuritiesAct] registration requirement, as well as section 5's prohibitions and
limitations on permissible offers to sell securities, is to assure that the investor has adequate
information upon which to base his or her investment decision.
THOMAS LEE HAzAN, THE LAW OF SECURMES REGULATION 78 (3d ed. 1996).
In keeping with the securities laws' stated goals of investor protection, the SEC established a three-
tiered system of registration and prospectus disclosures, depending on the issuer's reporting history and
market following-i.e., depending on how much information is already available to the public about a
particular issuer. See infta notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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Commentators have begun to reexamine the desirability of so-called
"company registration,"3 whereby an issuer's registration is deemed to
include all reports subsequently filed under the Securities Exchange Act of
19344 ("Exchange Act"), with only the actual transaction-specific terms
required to be disclosed for any new offering of securities.'
These three tiers are manifested in the various forms of registration statements, primarily Forms
S-i, S-2 and S-3. Form S-1 is to be used primarily by first-time issuers and issuers with securities publicly
held by only a limited number of shareholders. The general instructions to the form indicate that it is
to be used by all registrants "for which no other form is authorized or prescribed." Form S-2 permits
incorporation by reference and is available to all domestic registrants with a class of securities registered
under the Exchange Act who have participated in the continuous disclosure system set up by the Exchange
Act for at least 3 years. Form S-3 is available to issuers who have at least one year of Exchange Act filings
and a minimum net capitalization of $75 million (by non-affiliates). Form S-3 issuers need only include
transaction specific information on the proposed offering. See Forms S-1, S-2 and S-3, Securities Act, 2
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 17121 (Oct. 13, 1999) (Form S-1"); 117141-46 (Apr. 7, 1999) ("Form S-2");
1 7151-55 (Mar. 31, 1999) ("Form S-3") (settingout the requirements for each form). See HAZAN, supra
note 2, at 121-22; see also Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration: Toward a Status-BasedAntiftaud Regime, 64
U. CHI. L. REv. 567,569 n.6 (1997). According to Professor Choi:
The Securities Act already partially takes into account the range in the efficiency of trading
markets for different companies' securities. Based on the likelihood that a company trades in
an efficient market, the SEC partitions companies seeking registration into three groups: those
eligible for Form S-1, S-2, or S-3 registration... Companies that meet the S-3 qualifications
receive the greatest presumption of efficient market status and may incorporate the largest
amount of information by reference from their most recent Exchange Act filings into the
Securities Act registration statement. S-2 companies [have] a lower presumption of efficient
market status and consequently [are allowed] less incorporation by reference ... S-1
companies carry no presumption of efficient market trading and are consequently denied the
ability to incorporate by reference.
Id. at 578-79.
[T]he core idea in company registration is that eligible companies should be able to make
offers and sales of securities without submitting to a costly transaction registration process.
Prospectus content - and, indeed, the use of any recognizable "prospectus" - would be
determined by marketing needs and the general antifraud obligation to make full and fair
disclosure of material information, instead of by a predetermined formula prescribed in the
instructions to the SEC-mandated form of prospectus. Once a company became eligible for
company registration, it would register under the '34 Act and thereafter file periodic reports
under it. Routine financings would be consummated without any further '33 Act registration,
and any prospectus that was in fact prepared for marketing purposes would be shaped by
marketing needs, plus, of course, the antifraud rules of the '34 Act.
John C. Coffee, Re-Engineering CorporateDisclosure: The ComingDebate Over CompanyRegistration, 52 WASH.
& LEEL REV. 1143, 1155 (1995).
4 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. SS 78a-jj (1997)).
5 In 1995, the SEC established an Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory
Processes ("SEC Advisory Committee"), charging it with reviewing forms and rules relating to capital-
raising transactions, and with advising the SEC on "the informational needs of investors and the
regulatory costs imposed on the U.S. securities markets." See Charter of the Securities and Exchange
Commission Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes (February 24,
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Company registration is not a novel idea,6 and is best understood in its
historical context. This requires an examination of the purposes and
administration of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, both of which
were enacted in, and for, a very different economic and technological
environment.7 The stated purpose of the Securities Act is "to provide full
1995, renewed February 21, 1996) at http'/www.sec.gov/news/studies/capform/capffull.txt (last visited
Feb. 28, 2001). For a detailed discussion of the SEC Advisory Committee's recommendations, see infra
notes 104-166 and accompanying text.
According to ProfessorJohn C. Coffee, a leading scholar in the field of company registration:
Under the "company registration" model outlined in the Final Report of the Advisory
Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes, an eligible issuer would file
a one-time registration statement covering all its outstanding securities. Once effective, this
registration statement would apply to all the issuer's securities (including securities thereafter
authorized and issued), and all future 1934 Act reports automatically would be incorporated
by reference. Other than a nominal fee paid at the time of the initial filing, the issuer would
incur registration fees on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, at the time of individual sales.
Formal prospectus delivery would be largely eliminated, as the confirmation of sale
would incorporate by reference the contents of the statutory prospectus (except in certain
special transactions). Issuers electing "company registration" would be required to adopt
certain "disclosure enhancements" that sought to improve the quality oftheir 1934 Act filings,
and a Form 8-K would be required at the time of major equity takedown to cover material
developments since the time of the issuer's last Form 10-Q (as well as to provide transaction-
specific disclosures).
John C. Coffee, 1933Act Deregulation: A Guidefor the Perplexed, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 26, 1996, at 5.
6 According to one commentator, company registration is a concept "whose time has come and
gone and how has come again." See Choi, supra note 2, at 648.
7 The growth of capital markets, coupled with the increased number of institutional investors
and advances in technology have combined to change the invstingenvironment. In the 1930s, the capital
markets and their investors were much less sophisticated and thus the time frame to complete a public
offering was significantly longer, often taking six months or more for an underwriter to market and sell
an offering. See Michael McDonough, Death in OneAa: The CaseforCompanyRegistration, 24 PEPP. L REV.
563,566 n.31 (1997); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Is 5an/Anadhronism?, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 21, 1995, at 3.
After more than 50 years on the books, the registration provisions of the Securities Act
of 1933 - at least insofar as they apply to securities offerings by companies reporting under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 - have outlived their usefulness.
A partial demise of the act's registration provisions has become desirable - even urgent
- at this time for two important reasons.
First, the SEC is squandering resources by continuing to review 1933 act filings of
reporting companies. These resources could be more usefully devoted to the review of issuers'
periodic 1934 act disclosures as well as a more complete review of first-time registrants.
Second, the markets have changed in two important ways. The proliferation of new
types of securities and distribution techniques has put increasing pressure on the 1933 act list
of'exempt securities" and "exempt transactions,' while the developing internationalization
of the securities markets has created tension between the regulated domestic market and the
'unregulated" Eurodollar market.
Joseph McLaughlin, 1933Act's Registration Provisions: Is Time RipeforRepealing Them?, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 18,
1986, at 44.
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and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof,
and for other purposes."8 The stated purposed of the Exchange Act is "to
provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter
markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails,
to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets,
and for other purposes."
9
Completely absent from these stated purposes is any mention of
needlessly burdening issuers with duplicative and onerous disclosure
obligations, or of holding underwriters and other gatekeepers to a standard
of care that may be functionally impossible to satisfy."° Yet despite significant
modifications to both Acts over time, these are some of the results of the
current registration system."
8 The Preamble to the Securities Act of 1933,48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. SS
77a-aa (1997)). The Securities Act is primarily concerned with the issuance of securities and thus is
"transaction-focused." The statute requires issuers to make transaction specific disclosures to the market
and to potential investors. See Choi, supra note 2, at 567, 614.
9 The Preamble to the Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 55
78a-j (1997)). The disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act are not tied to specific transactions, but
are instead triggered by an issuer's status, in terms of its trading history and market capitalization and asset
base. See Choi, supa note 2, at 567.
1o According to the SEC Advisory Committee, the current registration scheme:
[1]mposes indirect and direct costs. The indirect costs include uncertainty and delay arising
from the possibility ofSEC staffreview (including the possibility oflosing a market window),
market overhangs, short-selling and related activities, and publicity constraints. Direct costs
include legal, accounting, underwriting, printing and filing fees.
SEC ADVISORY CoMMrTTEE, FINAL REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMTrrEE ON THE CAPrrAL FORMATION
AND REGULATORY PROCESSES, app. A (July 24, 1996), available at
http'/www.sec.gov/news/studies/capform/capffull.txt (last visited Feb. 28, 2001) (hereinafter SEC
Advisory Committee Final Report).
, For more than fifty-five years, the SEC has administered two parallel disclosure systems:
one for the registration of public offerings under the Securities Act of 1933 and the other for
the periodic reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The parallel
systems resulted in a great deal of duplicative filings and unnecessary paperwork. In 1982, the
Securities and Exchange Commission adopted an integrated disclosure system for registration
of securities under the 1933 Act. While some duplication remains, the institution of integrated
disclosures has made great strides in easing the disclosure burden. The current system
integrates and simplifies the disclosure requirements under the 1933 and 1934 securities acts.
The Commission has explained that its goal in adopting the new system was "to revise or
eliminate overlapping or unnecessary disclosure and dissemination requirements whenever
possible, thereby reducing the burdens on registrants while at the same time ensuring that
security holders, investors and the marketplace have been provided with meaningful, non-
duplicative information upon which to base investment decisions."
HAZAN, supra note 2, at 119-20 (citations omitted).
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Some practitioners and commentators question the utility and wisdom
of additional modification to a system that was arguably designed for another
era. 2 Perhaps the system should simply be abandoned as being obsolete and
interfering with efficient capital formation, with no compensating increase
in investor protection.13
12 Former Commissioner Steven Waillman, who chaired the SEC Advisory Committee,
questioned whether the "current registration requirements erect unnecessary obstacles to capital
formation without producing countervailing benefits for investors." See Steven M. H. Wallman, T7VSEC
and Oue Capital Formation Process, 9 INS[GKTS 3 (May 1995).
As the Securities Act of 1933 completes its sixty-third year of existence, its future is more
uncertain than at any other time in its history. Although its core principles were once hailed
as "a permanent and integral part of our legal system," the 1933 Act now merits such
descriptions as "obsolete" and its dictates are addressed in terms of "erosion." Now, the
innovative "company registration" disclosure model, recently embraced by the Securities and
Exchange Commission's Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory
Processes may very well signify the demise of the 1933 Act altogether.
McDonough, supra note 7, at 563.
Adopted during the depths of the Great Depression, the '33 Act predates the rise of
institutional investors, modem finance theory and the new trading patterns that have blurred
the differences between the primary and secondary securities markets. Nonetheless, it is far
from a statutory anachronism. Thus, the real issues are to what extent the '33 Act no longer
works and how it should be reformed.
John C. Coffee, Securities Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 11,1995, at B4.
Fundamental reforms are hard to achieve in the area of securities regulation, but nowhere
more so than in the 1933 act sector. Lacking the glamour and economic clout of 1934 act
issues such as market structure and tender offer regulation, 1933 act reforms tend to be held
up by a timid and tradition-bound SEC staff, an uninterested (or at best suspicious) Congress
and a complaisant securities bar. What is needed now is a serious consideration of the costs and
benefits of 1933 act registration to determine whether, as Prof. Homer Kripke has suggested,
it is "obsolete thinking" to continue to assert that registration still serves an important public
policy.
McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 44.
13 Laws and regulations are enacted in a given time period, presumably in the hope that they will
be able to serve their purpose over some period of time. But this may not prove to be the case:
Statutory obsolescence is the fate of all legislation. At some point in the natural "life cycle" of
any statute, courts tend to move from purposive statutory construction, focused on the actual
legislative intent, to greater deference towards administrative expertise as they implicitly
recognize that the original legislative intent no longer fits the contemporary institutional
landscape. Given that the federal securities laws were passed during the 1930s, they have now
entered the geriatric zone where their possible obsolescence must be considered. Some
academics have already called for the SEC's elimination on precisely this basis.
Coffee, supra note 3, at 1144; see als McDonough, supra note 7, at 563 n.185.
The time has come for fundamental change in the amount and methods of disclosure required
from companies issuing securities in the United States . . . the Securities Act of 1933 is
outmoded and should be replaced with legislation implementing, with some changes, the pilot
company registration system proposed by the Commission's Advisory Committee. In the
alternative, the Advisory Committee should recommend that the Commission request
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The more popular view, however, is somewhat less drastic, focusing on
how to work within the existing regulatory framework, through either
continued incremental modification,14 or by substituting in a new,
streamlined approach to registration - a company registration system.' s
Either additional modification or introduction of an entirely new system
would require statutory amendments by Congress or the exercise by the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") of its statutorily-granted
rulemaking authority. 6 Despite the SEC's rulemaking power, regulatory
broadened exemptive authority from Congress in order to implement most of the provisions
of company registration through administrative rulemaking.
Id. at 564-65.
14 The SEC "appears to be administratively repealing some of the Securities Act of 1933's clearest
prohibitions. Independently, Congress seems intent on 'deregulating' the Securities Act of 1933, in part
by making prospectus delivery optional with the investor." Coffee, supra note 3, at 1144. Some
commentators have proposed additional steps:
Repeal the registration provisions of the 1933 act for all securities offerings by reporting
companies; preserve Sec. 12(2) liability for issuers, officers, directors, underwriters, etc. (with
due- diligence defenses as in the case of Sec. 11) to individuals who purchase securities from
an issuer or control person on the basis of a false or misleading offering document (or where
no document was required to be furnished, on the basis of the issuer's 1934 act reports); and
preserve the SEC's ability on an administrative basis to take action in the event of any sale of
a security on the basis of false or misleading disclosure....
Lawyers who have mastered over the years the minutiae of the 1933 act exemptions and the
SEC registration process might find it difficult to accept the proposal. This includes, ofcourse,
the private bar and the professional SEC staff. After all, no '"priesthood"' likes to give up its
accustomed rituals. One can only hope that practitioners would in time come to acknowledge
the public benefits ofredirecting their talents to an improvement in the continuous disclosure
system.
McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 44.
Is The current regulatory system crafted during the era of the Great Depression does not
fully and most efficiently meet the needs and realities of today's markets, which are
increasingly complicated by modem financing techniques, technological advancements,
globalization, and changes in investors profiles and demands. These developments bring into
question whether all types of companies should be subject to the current Securities Act's
transactional registration requirements each time they desire to raise capital in the public
markets. After concluding that the current structure was imposing unnecessary costs, while
not fully taking into account the needs of today's investors, the [Advisory] Committee
determined to recommend a shift in the focus of the regulatory structure from the current
transactional system to a company registration system that would reduce these costs while
enhancing investor protection.
SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, at app. A.
I6 Since the Securities Act was first enacted, the SEC has had statutorily-granted power to "make,
amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of (the
Securities Act of 1933], including rules and regulations governing registration statements and
prospectuses." 15 U.S.C. S 77s (1997).
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revision, at least with respect to the implementation of any major changes to
the existing federal securities regulation landscape, has traditionally followed
a somewhat cyclical model.
First, there is discussion in the academic and professional literature,
commenting on, criticizing or proposing changes to some facet of the
existing regulatory system ("public debate"); then, either overlappingwith or
following this public debate, the SEC may informally float non-binding
suggestions for changes, through presentations at conferences, or unofficial
articles and publications written by SEC staff members ("agency debate").' 7
Again, perhaps overlapping with the agency debate, the SEC may next issue
a formal statement, such as a release, containing proposals to address, and
even further shape the discourse, seeking comments on the statements
("agency proposal"). After renewed public debate, and taking into
consideration, to varying extents, the comments made, the SEC then
exercises its rulemaking power and formalizes the revisions into rules
("agency action").
Because of the cyclical nature of the model, as new rules are enacted and
put into effect, courts may have an opportunity to interpret them or to pass
on their constitutionality, and commentators and the private bar have an
opportunity to evaluate the success of the new rules and any deficiencies or
other issues arising therefrom, generating additional public debate. Thus, in
the aftermath of the agency action, the cycle starts all over again ("next public
debate").
The agency action portion of the model has become much easier for the
SEC to accomplish in recent years. The SEC is now authorized by statute
to go beyond rulemaking simply to carry out the provisions of securities
laws."8
17 The SEC is always careful to at least nominally distance itself from these unofficial
contributions to the discourse by including a disclaimer in all articles written by its staff For example,
in her article, Linda C. Quinn, then director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance offered the
following disclaimer: "The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims
responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its members or employees. The views
expressed herein are those of Ms. Quinn and do not necessarily reflect the views of the SEC or its staff."
Linda C. Quinn, Reforming the Securities Act of 1933: A Conceptual Framework, 10 INSIGHTS 25, 26 (Jan.
1996).
These disclaimers should not be taken as a commentary on the substance ofthe pieces. For example,
despite this disclaimer, Ms. Quinn's article has been cited by commentators, and in fact is specifically
referenced in the SEC's concept release, seeking comments on company registration. See Securities Act
Concepts and Their Effects on Capital Formation, Securities Act Release No. 33-7314, 61 Fed. Reg.
40,044, 40,051 n.57 (July31, 1996)..
is The SEC has been given general exemptive authority to:
[C]onditionally or unconditionally, exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class
or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of [the
2001]
74 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:67
One useful area for exercise of the SEC's general exemptive authority
would be to adopt company registration, shifting the focus of the regulatory
process from registering transactions to registering companies.' Under
company registration, seasoned issuers subject to and in compliance with the
continuous disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act" could make offers
and sales of securities without additional registration under the Securities
Act.2 ' Eligible issuers would file a company registration statement, disclosing
plans to make offerings from time to time, generically registering the types
of securities and offerings contemplated, incorporating all existing and future
Securities Act] or of any rule or regulation issued under [the Securities Act], to the extent that
such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. SS 77z-3,78mm (1997).
19 For a full discussion of the company registration proposal recommended by the SEC Advisory
Committee, see infra notes 104-166 and accompanying text.
20 Registration under the Exchange Act triggers participation in the periodic disclosure system,
including filing of Form 10-K (annual report), Form 10-Q (quarterly report) and Form 8-K (current
report to report certain specified material changes in the issuer's conditions or operations). See Forms 10-
K, IOQ, 8Q, Exchange Act, 5 Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 131,102-07 ("Form 10-K"); 131,031-35 ("Form
10-Q"); 131,001-04 ('Form 8-K").
21 The SEC Advisory Committee recommended, and the SEC proposed, the institution of a
company registration system, through the following steps:
*on a one-time basis, the issuer files a registration statement (deemed effective immediately)
that includes information similar to that currently provided in an initial short-form shelf
registration statement. This registration statement could then be used for all types of securities
and all offerings (including those offered in furtherance of business acquisitions) and all
offerings could be subject to Section 11 strict liability,
*current and future Exchange Act reports are incorporated by reference into that registration
statement;
*around the time of the offering, transactional and updating disclosures are filed with the SEC,
usually in a Form 8-K that is incorporated by reference into the registration statement and
subject to Section 11 strict liability, but in certain cases, at the option of the issuer, through a
prospectus supplement like those traditionally filed in shelftakedowns;
*other than a nominal fee paid at the initial filing, registration fees would be paid at the time
of sale rather than prior to making any offers (the "pay as you go" feature);
*issuers would be required to adopt some disclosure enhancements (and encouraged to adopt
others) that seek to improve the quality and timeliness ofdisclosure provided to investors and
the markets; and
*formal prospectuses would be required to be physically delivered only in non-routine
transactions and, when so required to be delivered, they would have to be delivered in time
to be considered in connection with the investment decision. In almost all instances, an issuer
could incorporate by reference filed information into selling materials or the confirmation of
sale to satisfy the legal obligation to deliver a prospectus (which, under the statute, must
precede or accompany a confirmation of sale).
See Securities Act Concepts and Their Effects on Capital Formation, 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,044.
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periodic reports. The registration form would be automatically updated by
each Exchange Act filing.2
The idea behind company registration is that reporting companies have
already given the market all of the material information necessary to support
an informed investment decision, and such information is already reflected
in the market price of the securities. Thus, there is no need for any
additional registration of any particular transaction itself, since no further
informational advantage would be gained.2'
A company registration system, with all eligible issuers participating,
would obviate much of the need for the complexities necessary to protect the
paradigm of transactional registration, such as classifying securities as
"restricted," 24 determining what constitutes a "general solicitation " 2s and
when offers are to be integrated.26
Agency action to adopt a company registration system is the next logical
step in the progression from a transaction-based registration system to a
company-based registration system. This progression includes the public
debate and agency action that was the precursor of company registration' -
the adoption of the integrated disclosure system for the primary offering and
secondary trading markets2 and the adoption of the shelf registration
2 See SEC ADviSoRy COMMITrEE, THE CAPITAL FORMATION AND REGULATORY PROCESSES:
TERM SHEET FOR PILOT COMPANY REGISTRATION SYSTEM 1 (July 24, 1996) available at
htrp'/Avww.sec.gov/news/studies/capfofrn/capffull.txt (last visited Feb. 28, 2001) (hereinafter SEC
Advisory Committee Term Sheet).
Z See Donald C. Langevoort, Theoria, Assumptions, and Seatifies Reguation: Market Efficiency
Revisited, 140 U. PENN. L. REv. 851, 875 (1992).
24 Securities acquired directly or indirectly from an issuer in a non-public offering, are considered
to have the status of S 4(2) "restricted securities" and cannot be resold without registration or further
exemption. See ALAN R. PALMrrER, SEcuRrriES REGULATION 134 (Aspen Law & Business, 1998).
2s Regulation D prohibits "general solicitations or general advertising" in a Rule 505 or 506
offering&. this prohibition is designed to "ensure that the issuer (or its financial adviser) knows the
investment sophistication and financial circumstances of all offerees. In effect, it mandates that suitability
screening occur before any Regulation D solicitation - not as part of the solicitation." Id. at 133.
2 See Wallman, supra note 12, at3.
2 Over the last thirty years, the [SEC] has begun to acknowledge the increasing pressures
for change. Beginning with adoption of the integrated disclosure system in 1980, the
Commission has made some headway toward combining the disclosure requirements of the
1933 Act and the Exchange Act of 1934 to arrive at a coordinated, non-duplicative, and less
costly system of disclosure. Regulation S-K, adopted in 1982, itemized several areas of
disclosure common to 1933 and 1934 Act filings in an attempt to synthesize information
provided by companies subject to both Acts. Shelf registration emerged from the integrated
disclosure system as a way for issuers to go to the market more efficiently and more often by
relying on disclosures required under the 1934 Act.
McDonough, supra note 7, at 564.
28 See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 33-6383, 47 Fed.
Reg. 11,380, 11,384 (Mar. 16, 1982).
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process.' This was followed by the penultimate step towards a company-
based registration system, the universal shelf'0
Arguably, the entire federal securities regulatory system fits into the
cyclical model. This Article, however, is limited to an exploration of the
company registration proposal put forth by the SEC in July 1996 in its
historical context. Part II of this Article is an application of the cyclical
model to the adoption of the integrated disclosure system and the shelf
registration process. Part III is an application of the cyclical model to the
SEC's company registration proposal as a logical outflow of prior debates,
including a discussion of possible issues left unresolved by or raised by the
company registration proposal that may generate the next public debate, with
a recommendation that the SEC adopt company registration.
H. ADOPTION OF THE INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE SYSTEM AND
SHELF REGISTRATION PROCESS
A. The Public Debate
The public debate culminating in the adoption of the integrated
disclosure system and shelf registration process stemmed at least in part from
the separate nature of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, and the
inefficiencies resulting therefrom.3' The Securities Act is a system of
transaction-based disclosure, with the timing of disclosures linked to an
issuer's sale of securities. 2 The Exchange Act superimposes a separate
29 See Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499,48 Fed. Reg. 52,889,52,890 (Nov.
23, 1983). Shelf registration is governed by Rule 415; see also 17 CFR S 230.415 (1999). Under Rule
415(a)(1)(x), an issuer can register securities "to be offered and sold on a continuous or delayed basis" if
the issuer qualifies for Form S-3 or Form F-3. See id.
30 See Simplification of Registration Procedures for Primary Securities Offerings, Securities Act
Release No. 33-6964, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,970,48,974 (Oct. 29, 1992). Under the universal shelf.
[E]ligible issuers could register debt, equity or other securities on a single shelf registration
statement without having to specify the amount of each class of securities to be offered. As a
practical matter, this minimized the market penalty that some issuers had incurred by filing
an equity shelf registration statement (because the announcement of an equity offering usually
leads to a decline in the issuer's stock market price).
Coffee, supra note 5, at 5.
31 See HAzAN, supra note 2, at 119-20.
32 Section 5 of the Securities Act regulated disclosure in a public offering; these rules are
commonly referred to as the "gun jumping" rules. No security may be offered, unless a registration
statement has been filed with the SEC no prospectus may be disseminated unless it contains the
statutorily-specified information and no security may be sold or delivered unless the registration statement
has been declared effective, and all investors have received a formal prospectus. See 15 U.S.C. S 77(e)
(1997); see also Palmitcr, supra note 24, at 100-01; Choi, supra note 2, at 605-06.
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regime of company-specific disclosure, creating a system of continuous,
periodic disclosure, which, if complied with fully and in a timely manner,
substantially reduces the need for transaction-specific disclosure when an
issuer later seeks to sell its securities.3 The Securities Act and the Exchange
Act historically were administered essentially independently; the two statutes
required similar and sometimes duplicative information, with inconsistent
presentation requirements.' As a result of this overlapping registration
system, even seasoned issuers making timely disclosures to the market
through the continuous disclosure system as required by the Exchange Act,
and thereby fully informing the market of information necessary to make an
investment decision, must also register public offerings of their securities
under the Securities Act.3"
The first significant attempt at legislative reform to address this overlap
came in the form of agency debate, with an SEC-appointed committee,
including Professor Louis Loss, and an industry-appointed committee, both
charged with examining the provisions of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act. Hearings before the House Commerce Committee in 1941
on the committees' recommendations to Congress yielded no significant
changes in the law. The concept of legislative reform resurfaced in the late
1950s, this time resulting in the introduction of several bills, but again,
Congress did not take action.36 Then Congress enacted the Securities Act
Amendments of 1964, significantly revising the Exchange Act to bring over-
the-counter issuers within its registration requirements, and arguably
33 For an overview of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, see McDonough, supra note 7, at
565-83.
[11n the case of reporting companies, the] 10-K and other 1934 act reports arc the most
important SEC-mandated disclosure documents, providing information to investors either
directly (often by electronic means) or through the medium of securities analysts. This is the
result intended by the SEC, of course, when as part of the "integrated disclosure system" it
permitted many issuers to incorporate their 1934 act reports into 1933 act prospectuses. Given
the success of the system and the parallel disclosure requirements under the two acts, it is hard
to see how investors benefit - from a disclosure point of view - by 1933 act registration of a
particular securities offering.
McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 44.
3 See Edward F. Greene, Integration of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act: A Case Study of
Regulation in the Division of Corporate Finance of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 3 J.
COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 75, 76 (1981).
35 "For decades, the '33 and '34 Acts were administered independently and seemingly almost in
oblivion of each other. Not only was duplicative information required under each, but the manner of its
required presentation was different and terms used in common by both Acts were defined differently by
each." Coffee, supra note 3, at 1158.
3 See Louis Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Secuities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAw. 27, 29
(1969); see also Coffee, supra note 3, at 1145.
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satisfying whatever desire Congress had then to overhaul the securities
laws.'
However, participants in the public debate were far from satisfied with
this new state of affairs; increasing the coverage of the Exchange Act
exacerbated the complications resulting from the lack of integration between
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. The public debate on integration
began in earnest with the 1966 publication of Milton Cohen's widely
respected article "Truth in Securities" Revisited, in which he proposed a model
for updating the federal securities laws.38 Cohen's thesis was that securities
regulation would look very different if the Exchange Act had been enacted
first, or if the two Acts had been enacted as a single, comprehensive statute.
Cohen proposed a fully integrated continuous disclosure system, under
which the issuer would be required to disclose only material information not
previously disclosed. 9
A concurrent component of the public debate, proposing much the same
solution, but aimed more directly at generating some form of agency action,
was the American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code ("ALl Code"), an
attempt to re-codify all six federal securities statutes into a single
comprehensive code.4° This project was inspired in part by the Cohen article
3 See 78 Stat. 565 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
34 See Milton Cohen, "Truth in SeuritiesRisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340 (1966).
39 Id. at 1341, 1406-08; see also Coffee, supra note 3, at 1144-45. According to Professor Choi:
In assessing the two regimes, Cohen recognized that disclosures pursuant to a public offering
under the Securities Act consist of information that all investors require prior to making an
investment decision, including not only those investors purchasing from the offering, but also
those trading in the secondary market. From this observation, Cohen called into question the
need for mandatory disclosures directed towards parties of any particular transaction and
argued for the reform of the securities regime toward one, unified company-based information
disclosure scheme.
Choi, supra note 2, at 567.
40 See The Securities Act of 1933,48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. SS 77a-aa (1997));
The Securities Act of 1934,48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. SS 78a-jj (1997)); The Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,49 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. SS 79 1997)); The
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. SS 77aaa et seq. (1997));
The Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as U.S.C. SS 80a-1 et seq. (1997)); The
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. SS 80b-1 et seq. (1997)).
The goal of the ALl Code was:
[N]ot only to achieve a unifying integration of these separate statutes, addressed at different
times to closely related problems, but also to point the way toward their improvement,
clarifying their obscurities, eliminating inconsistencies, articulating important norms
developed in interpretive judgments and, within the limits of the basic legislative policy,
proposing improvements that informed opinion favors and seems ready to support.
I ALI, FEDERAL SicuRrrms CODE at vii-viii (1980).
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and championed by Professor Loss.4t
The ALI Code is a comprehensive model of an integrated securities law,
building disclosure around registering companies, not registering
transactions - in other words, company registration. Thus, each new
securities issue would not require a separate registration statement-all the
information, including all periodic disclosure documents filed under the
Exchange Act, would already be in the issuer's file. The information
contained in the company registration statement, updated to reflect material
changes, would be the main source of information to be incorporated into
the "offering statement" that registered the specific securities offered, as well
as the "prospectus," to be delivered to purchasers upon confirmation of sale
and delivery.4 2
Drafting of the ALI Code began in the Fall of 1969 and was completed
in 1978.43 This time span is notable both for its duration and for its varying
regulatory and political climate. While the project started out during a period
favorable to federal regulation, over the life of the project, the regulatory
climate shifted towards deregulation: the Supreme Court began limiting
federal involvement in securities laws and the membership of the SEC
shifted towards more laissez-faire economists."4 By the time the ALI Code
According to Professor Loss, the ALl Code had three principal aims: (i) simplification of an
"inevitably complex body of law in the light ofalmost a half-century of administration and litigation;" (2)
elimination of duplicate registration, to the extent possible; and (3) reexamination of the entire scheme
of investor protection in the hopes of increasing its efficiency. See id. at xiX
41 See Choi, supra note 2, at 568. Professor Loss' approach was not to criticize the SEC in its
administration of the various securities laws, but instead to acknowledge that "because of the failure to
recognize by appropriate legislation that, although the registration and prospectus machinery was central
to disclosure in 1933, other disclosure devices have since been developed that are even mor effective."
Se Loss supra note 36, at 28-30.
4 See Gerald S. Backman & Stephen E. Kim, A Cure For Securities Act Metaphysics: Intigrated
Registration, 9 INSIGHTS 18,20 (May 1995).
4 Professor Loss had been quoted as saying that the securities laws should be codified, even if
it took twenty years; he later clarified that, saying the remark:
(W]as misinterpreted by some people as a prediction that codification would take twenty years.
Now, maybe it will- I hope it won't- but certainly I don't predict it will, and certainly it
should not. The point is, though, that in any event it's going to take longer than administrative
reform, so in that sense alone there is no inconsistency.
Loss, supra note 36, at 32.
Professor Loss showed unfortunate prescience in his description of the time commitment necessary
for a project of this magnitude: " [A]s in any codification effort, constant attention will also have to be paid
to the extent to which we want to draft an ideal code and the extent to which we shall have to be practical.
I don't think any of us who would be doing the work would be interested in devoting four or five years
to an academic exercise." Id. at 37.
" For a discussion of the changes in regulatory climate, see Robert W. Hamilton, The State ofState
Corporation Law: 1986, 11 DELJ. CORP. L. 3, 18-19 (1986).
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was finally finished, despite formal approval by the ALI and the SEC,4s and
the support of the American Bar Association and much of the private bar, it
was never enacted into law.46
B. The Agency Debate and Proposals
Despite the lack of Congressional action on statutory integration, either
through the ALI Code or otherwise, during the 1980s, the SEC, after
proposing ideas for comment, exercised its rulemaking authority to
implement many of the most popular ideas in Cohen's article and in the ALI
Code.47 The SEC attempted to effectively integrate the disclosure system by
equalizing the requirements under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act,4"
such as incorporation by reference49 and shelf registration for certain
seasoned issuers,"° but stopped short of proposing a company registration
system.
5
'
45 "Despite completion of the Code in 1980 and Commission approval, Congress was reluctant
to dismantle the venerable 1933 and 1934 Acts with an untried system, and quietly forgot the Code in the
absence of a strong lobby outside the Commission itself." McDonough, supra note 7, at 587.
Congress declined to act, thereby choosing to retain the dual transaction and status based
framework. See Choi, supra note 2, at 569. "When the ALI's Federal Securities Code was presented to
Congress in 1980, Congress essentially yawned and declined to act. Unfortunately, 'good govemment'
reform does not excite powerful constituencies nor generate the level of emotion necessary to stir a
lethargic Congress into action." Coffee, supra note 3, at 1145-46.
While this code ultimately was not enacted into law by Congress, it has been cited, I believe,
more frequently than any other unadopted legislative proposal in this country's history, and
has served as the inspiration for a number of law reforms at the SEC. Most recently, when
Commissioner Steven M.H. Wallman sought a new approach to the SEC's mandatory
disclosure system in 1997, he drew on the Federal Securities Code's company registration
model.
Joel Seligman, He Wrote the Book on Securities Regulation, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 29,1997/Jan. 5, 1998, at A15.
47 "The SEC also looked into the possibility of moving toward a company registration system
immediately after Cohen's article was published during the 1960's, an investigation that culminated in
the Wheat Report." Choi, supra note 2, at 568 n.9.
48 "Based upon the conclusions of the Wheat Report, as well as the recommendations of the
Commission's Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure published in 1977, the Commission moved
to integration of the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act." SEC Advisory
Committee Final Report, supra note 10, app. B.
49 Seasoned issuers are permitted, under certain circumstances, to incorporate into a registration
statement filed under the Securities Act various other filings, such as Forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K. See
supra note 20.
50 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
s1 "The Commission's basic strategy was to make the periodic reports filed under the '34 Act
contain disclosure equivalent to that which would be in a '33 Act prospectus, and then to allow certain
widely followed companies to incorporate by reference the information from their periodic reports into
their prospectuses at the time they made a subsequent public offering." Coffee, supra note 3, at 1158; see
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While the SEC developed the integrated disclosure system, it considered
what information was material to investment decisions in public offerings of
securities. The SEC concluded that full integration required that whatever
was material for transactional reporting under the Securities Act was also
material for periodic reporting under the Exchange Act. Integration,
therefore, meant that the substantive requirements for the two Acts should
be comparable.5 2
The SEC also considered under what circumstances such material
information should be disseminated to security holders, investors and the
marketplace, and determined that the dissemination of information should
depend on the degree to whith the market has already been informed. 3 The
SEC tacitly accepted the basic idea of the "efficient market hypothesis," that
financial analysts and market participants absorb information so the market
reaches the "correct" price; an adequately informed market does not need
duplicative information to correctly price outstanding securities.M With
these considerations in mind, the SEC proposed the integrated disclosure
system with its three-tiered registration structure,5 permitting increasing
amounts of information to be incorporated by reference from previous
filings, and the shelf registration system. 6
also Donald C. Langevoort, Colloquium: Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FoRDHAM L. REv. 7, 16
n.50 (1993); Loss, supra note 36, at 31.
52 See Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offerings,
Release No. 33-6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693, 63,696 (Sept. 25, 1980); see also Adoption of Integrated
Disclosure System, Securities Release No. 33-6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,388 (Mar. 16, 1982);
Backman & Kim supra note 42, at 19.
S3 See Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offerings, 45
Fed. Reg. 63,693, 63,695 (Proposed Sept. 25, 1980); see also Backman & Kim supra note 42, at 19.
54 See Langevoort, supra note 23. According to the SEC:
The dissemination requirements have been developed, in part, on the premise that information
regularly furnished to the marketplace through formal Exchange Act periodic reports and
informal corporate communications may be reflected in the price of the outstanding securities
and thus need not always be reiterated in a prospectus in the context of a distribution.
Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,381.
ss See text supra note 2.
After the securities laws were expanded to give the SEC jurisdiction to mandate annual and
periodic, as well as transactional, disclosure for all public companies, the dichotomy between
transactional and annual financial reporting came under criticism and integration of the
Securities Act and Exchange Act was advocated. In response, the SEC developed its integrated
disclosure system whereby annual and periodic reports filed pursuant to the Exchange Act by
seasoned issuers could be incorporated by reference in offering documents filed pursuant to
the Securities Act. Further, securities could be registered and put on the shelf for future
offering when advantageous capital windows were opened.
Karmel, supra note 7, at 3.
56 See Adoption oflntegrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,388; see also text supra note 2.
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The SEC had long resisted the idea of shelf registration of securities in
excess of amounts that the issuer intended to offer,"7 nominally because of
the statutory problem in the language of S 6(a) of the Securities Act, 8 and
actually out of a concern that advance registration would lead to prospective
investors relying on stale information. 9 Integrated disclosure would solve
this by incorporating subsequently filed Exchange Act filings, thereby
keeping the prospectuses current.' The SEC began to back away from a
rigid interpretation of S 6(a), and by the early 1960s it became clear that
certain types of offerings could be made by shelf registrations statements.
Section 7 controls the content of registration statements, and authorizes the SEC to allow certain
omissions in registration statements in respect of any class of issuers or securities if it finds that that the
requirement of the omitted information "is inapplicable to such class and that disclosure fully adequate
for the protection of investors is otherwise required to be included within the registration statement."
15 U.S.C. S 77g (1997).
Section 10 controls the content of prospectuses, and S 10(a)(4) allowing the SEC to omit any
information not "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15
U.S.C. S 77j (1981); see also Backman and Kim, supra note 42, at 18-19.
37 An amendment to the Securities Act modifying S 6(a) to permit shelf registration was opposed
by the SEC, and never enacted. See H.R. 4344,77th Cong. (1941); S. 3985 76th Cong. (1940).
s Section 6(a) provides that a registration statement "shall be deemed effective only as to
securities specified therein as proposed to be offered." The SEC traditionally interpreted this provision
to mean that registering more securities than the issuer presently intended to offer would be misleading
Rule 415 now permits issuers to register an amount of securities that "is reasonably expected to be offered
and sold within two years from the initial effective date of the registration," not to exceeil ten percent of
the issuer's voting stock. See Rule 415(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. S 230.415(a)(2) (1999); Rule 415(a)(4)(ii), 17
C.F.R. S 230.415(a)(4)(ii) (1999); see aLso Scott Hodes, She!f Registration: The Dilemma of the Securities and
Exchange Commission,49 VA. L. REV. 1106,1108-15 (1963).
39 For decades, the SEC had resisted the shelf registration of securities in excess of the
amount that the issuer then intended to offer, for fear that advance registration would mean
stale prospectuses .... In 1983, the Commission accepted the arguments for shelf registration
and broadened Rule 415 to permit an issuer to register up to approximately ten percent of its
voting stock for sale in delayed "at the market" offerings. However, the issuer was required
to certify that it "reasonably expected to... [offer and sell the amount so registered] within two
years from the initial effective date of the registration.
Coffee, supra note 5, at 1158-59; see aLso McDonough, supra note 7, at 590.
60 See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1158.
61 See CHARLESJ.JOHNSONJR., CORPORATEFINANCEANDTHE SECURITIES LAWS 381 (Prentice
Hall Law& Business 1990).
Under Rule 415, registrants may register securities:
[I]n an amount which, at the time the registration statement becomes effective, is reasonably
expected to be offered and sold within two years from the initial effective date of the
registration.. .where voting stock is registered, the amount of securities registered for such
purposes must not exceed 10 percent of the aggregate market value of the registrant's
outstanding voting stock held by non-affiliates of the registrant [calculated as of a date within
60 days prior to the date of the filing].
17 C.F.R. S 230.415(2) (1999).
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The adoption of shelf registration followed the cyclical model of
regulatory development; the agency action by the SEC culminating in its
adoption of Rule 415, involved extensive public and agency debate and a
number of agency proposals.6 In response to the public debate on its
proposals, the SEC adopted shelf registration under Rule 415 on a temporary
basis, in order to afford continued consideration.' The SEC proposed
monitoring the operations of the Rule, while holding public hearings on
issues such as investor protection under the Securities Act, capital raising by
corporate issuers through shelf registration and due diligence concerns.6
The SEC then extended Rule 415's effectiveness.65
Not all of the SEC Commissioners were enthusiastic about the
possibility of shelf registrations. Commissioner Thomas, in her dissent to
6 First, the SEC proposed the rescission of the Guides for the Preparation and Filing of
Registration Statements and Reports, except for Guides for disclosure by issuers in a particular industry.
Included in the proposal was the rescission of Guide 4, which contained the instances in which shelf
registration was contemplated. The SEC published proposed Rule 462A (Delayed or Continuous
Offering and Sale of Securities) for comment, a comprehensive position with respect to shelf registration
statements. See Proposed Revision of Regulation S-K and Guides for the Preparation and Filing of
Registration Statements and Reports, Securities Release No. 33-6276, 46 Fed. Reg. 78, 87 (Jan. 2, 1981).
Proposed Rule 462A was largely ignored, perhaps because it was essentially buried in a lengthy
release proposing for comment, among other things, the reorganization of Regulation S-K and the
elimination or incorporation into Regulation S-K or Regulation C of all almost all of the guides. Some
of the public commenters on Rule 462A expressed concern that the rule had not received sufficient
attention because of its placement in the lengthy release; they recommended that the rule be republished
in a separate release. SeEJOHNSON,supra note 61, at 397; see also Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale
of Securities, Securities Release No. 33-6334, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,001,42,003 (Aug. 6, 1981).
The SEC then reproposed Rule 462A in a separate release, Securities Release No. 33-6334,48 Fed.
Reg. 52,889 (Aug. 6, 1981), which received much attention, mostly from panicked investment banks,
fearing that the rule would undermine or impair the "traditional manner in which securities had been
distributed to the public- fixed price offerings through underwriting syndicates." SeeJOHNSON, supra
note 61, at 397.
63 See McDonough, supra note 7. at 590.
6 See Examination of the Registration of Securities to be Offered and Sold on a Delayed or
Continuous Basis in the Future, Securities Release No. 33-6391, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,701,11,702-03 (Mar.
18,1982).
6s This action was taken in view of.
(T]he number of commentators who believe that insufficient time has elapsed since the Rule
became effective to assess its full impact and in light of the market conditions which have
prevailed during this period ... it is necessary to extend the period during which Rule 415 is
effective to December 31, 1983 in order to obtain sufficient experience upon which to base
[the SEC's] final determination of the Rule. The Commission believes that an additional
twelve month period is appropriate, because it would provide a greater opportunity to study
the operation and impact of Rule 415 through what may be a full financial cycle.
Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale of Securities, Securities Release No. 33-6423, 47 Fed. Reg.
39,790,39,799 (Sept. 10, 1982).
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the SEC's approval on shelf registration, argued that Rule 415 as proposed
posed risks to the capital markets and to the disclosure system, and
"incurring these risks is antithetical to the statutory duty of the Commission
to protect investors and to maintain the integrity of our capital markets."'
With respect to the capital markets, she was of the opinion that the Rule,
especially when applied to equity offerings, would jeopardize "the liquidity
and stability of our primary and secondary securities markets by encouraging
greater concentrations of underwriters, market-makers, and other financial
intermediaries and by discouraging individual investor participation in the
capital markets thereby furthering the trend towards institutionalization of
securities holders." 67 She believed that the short turn-around time permitted
by a shelf registration might impede the formation of traditional
underwriting syndicates, and instead encourage smaller syndicates, resulting
in the elimination of most small and regional broker-dealers from major
underwritings."
With respect to the disclosure system, Commissioner Thomas argued
that further accelerating the registration process through shelf registration
might reduce the quality and timeliness of disclosure available to investors.69
Because of the accelerated timing of registrations under the Rule, the
underwriters would not have sufficient time to perform adequate due
diligence, thereby undercutting investors' ability "to rely upon the
underwriters' obligation to interpose itself between the issuer and investor
and to investigate the disclosures contained in the prospectus."
70
To alleviate these concerns, Commissioner Thomas suggested limiting
the principal application of Rule 415 to debt offerings, prohibiting its general
use for primary equity offerings, and imposing a "notice period" of two
business days for debt issuances not registered on Form S-3."1
Commissioner Thomas and other critics of the proposed shelf
registration feared that it would limit the amount of due diligence that
underwriters could (or would) undertake. But in the years since the
adoption of the shelf registration system, while it is clear that advance due
diligence for shelf offerings has declined as a result of their truncated
timetables, there have been no "memorable scandals" resulting therefrom.7 2
" Se id. at 39803 (Commissioner Thomas dissent).
67 Id.
6 See id. at 39809.
69 See id. at 39806.
70 See id. at 39807.
71 See id. at 39804.
72 See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1169.
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Commissioner Thomas' concerns were not unfounded and many
resurfaced during the recent discourse on company registration. A company
registration system might alleviate some of these concerns, specifically by
eliminating the two-year and ten percent limitations of Rule 415, allowing
registration statements to be "evergreen."73
C. The Agency Action
In addition to the adoption of shelf registration, the SEC in 1982 also
adopted the integrated disclosure system in an effort to address the
duplicative disclosure under the Securities Act and Exchange Act, including
the expansion and revision of Regulation S-K, which set out disclosure
standards for both Acts.74 To avoid duplication, the SEC also adopted the
three-tiered registration system 7 to allow progressively more information to
be incorporated by reference for issuers who have been subject to the
periodic reporting requirements.76
After seeking additional comment on Rule 415, the SEC adopted it on
a permanent basis in November 1983.77 For the first time, in deference to
the concerns expressed by industry participants and Commissioner Thomas,
the SEC limited shelf filings for primary offerings of debt and equity
securities to those made on Form S-3, as the types of offerings where "the
benefits of shelf registration are most significant and where the disclosure
and due diligence concerns are mitigated by other factors."78
73 See id. at 1161.
74 See Proposed Revision of Regulation S-K and Guides for the Preparation and Filing of
Registration Statements and Reports, Securities Release No. 33-6276,46 Fed. Reg. 78,79 (proposed Jan.
2, 1981); see also Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 33-6383,47 Fed.
Reg. 11,380, 11,389 (Mar. 16, 1982).
7s See text supra note 2.
76 Over the last decade, the Commission has gone far in eliminating problems associated
with duplicative disclosure obligations under the two Acts by "integrating" their disclosure
requirements. This was accomplished, in part, through the adoption of Regulation S-K in
1982. In addition, the Commission has facilitated more rapid market access for seasoned
companies by streamlining the registration process through the adoption, first, of Form S-16,
then Form S-3, and, more recently, the creation of the "universal" shelf.
Wallman, supra note 12, at 2.
n See Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale of Securities, Securities Release No. 33-6470,
48 Fed. Reg. 27,768 Uun. 17, 1983); see aLso Shelf Registration, Securities Release No. 33-6499, 48 Fed.
Reg. 52,889 (Nov. 23, 1983).
78 One of the "other factors" that the SEC pointed to was the efficient market hypothesis.
It stated that at the time that registrants on Form S-3 or Form F-3 determine to make an
offering of securities, "a large amount of information already has been disseminated to and
digested by the marketplace." It recognized that some commentators had said that no
20011
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The SEC citedithe benefits of shelf registration, including cost savings,
flexibility, simplification and increased competition among underwriters.79
In response to the concerns of Commissioner Thomas, as well other
participants in the discourse who felt that investor disclosure would suffer,
the SEC argued that the integrated disclosure system enhanced the level of
disclosure to investors, building on the existence of timely and accurate
corporate filings and thus investors were adequately protected.80 As for the
due diligence concerns, the SEC acknowledged the potential problem, but
argued that anticipatory and continued due diligence programs would assure
disclosure to investors and afford underwriters an opportunity to perform
due diligence."' However, these programs, while theoretically feasible, in
reality would be very costly, in terms of time and money, and thus the
concept is of limited practical value. 
2
By contrast, some commentators have argued that the introduction of the
integrated disclosure system, allowing certain Exchange Act reporting
companies to "incorporate by reference," and the adoption of the shelf
registration process, provide investors in companies with securities in an
efficient market with much of the public information available in order to
make informed investment decisions.'
underwriter can afford to devote the time and expense necessary to conduct a due diligence
review before knowing whether it will handle an offering, and that there may not be sufficient
time to do so once it is selected. The SEC pointed, on the other hand, to statements by
registrants that procedures for conducting due diligence had been developed, including
periodic due diligence sessions for prospective underwriters and continuous due diligence by
the law firm selected to serve as underwriters' counsel.
JOHNSON, supra note 61, at 441; see also text supra note 2.
7 See Shelf Registration, 48 Fed. Reg. at 52,889.
8D See id. at 52892.
81 The integrated disclosure system recognizes that, for companies in the top tier, there is
a steady stream of high quality corporate information continually furnished to the market and
broadly digested, synthesized and disseminated. In addition, procedures for conducting due
diligence investigations ofsuch registrants, including continuous due diligence by means such
as designated underwriters counsel, are being adapted to the integrated disclosure system and
shelf registration. The Commission believes that the widespread market following of such
companies and the due diligence procedures being developed serve to address the concerns
about the adequacy of disclosure and due diligence and, thus, ensure the protection of
investors.
Id. at 52892-93.
M See id. at 52896 (Special Concurring Opinion of Chairman Shad).
63 See Choi, supra note 2, at 569-70 n.19. Professor Choi uses the term "efficient market" to refer
to a "trading market that displays features ofa semistrong efficient market ... the semistrong version of
the efficient capital markets hypothesis posits that the secondary market price of companies reflects all
publicly available information on the company." Id. (citing Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A
Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970), and Donald C. Langevoort, Information
Technolgy and the Structure of Seurities R gulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747, 778-79 (1985)).
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D. The Next Public Debate
The last stage of the cyclical model, the next public debate flowing from
the continuing evaluation of the usefulness of the agency action, continues
to play itself out today. The integrated disclosure system and the availability
of shelf registration are universally viewed as an improvement over the prior
system. The SEC has edged closer to company registration with its adoption
of the universal shelf " The most recent public debate centered on exploring
whether the integrated disclosure system goes far enough, and, if not, how
best to proceed.
Much of the prior public and agency debate still contributes to the
discourse. Many of Commissioner Thomas' concerns shaped the debate on
shelf registration itself, and now serve as the basis for much of the discourse
on company registration, including issues such as the effect on investor
protection and the ability of underwriters to accomplish meaningful due
diligence.85
The Cohen article continues to generate discussion, even today, in that
Cohen proposed the idea of company registration as part of his view on
integrated disclosure.8 6 Cohen's observation that the two statutes are not well
integrated is almost universally accepted, yet progress towards remedyingthis
situation in any meaningful way has been very slowY Because of the cyclical
nature of regulatory revision, company registration is not a revolution, but
rather an evolution, flowing logically from the discourse, answering much
of the debate, and yet itself generating additional debate.'
84 "The SEC, moreover, in 1992 further loosened restrictions on shelf registration, adopting the
'universal' shelf which allows Form S-3 issuers to register a specified dollar amount of securities for the
shelf without allocating these securities to any particular class of securities." Choi, supra note 2, at 651
n.18. For a comparison of company registration and universal shelf registration, see SEC Advisory
Committee Final Report, supra note 10, addendum to app. B.
as Coffee, among others, has argued that shelf registration has hurt the ability of under-
writers and auditors to conduct their due diligence investigations. This view, however, ignores
the market incentives of issuers and underwriters to find a way for underwriters to perform
a certification function to the extent investors value certification. The drop in due diligence
investigations, therefore, may reflect more the low value that investors place on the legal level
of due diligence and less the failing of the certification mechanism.
Choi, supra note 2, at 651 n.67.
86 See Cohen, supra note 38, at 1353.
7 See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1145.
as Full integration, however, was not achieved and, absent legislation, arguably may never
be fully achievable. Under a completely integrated disclosure system, registration under the
'34 Act would suspend the obligation to register issuances of securities under the '33 Act. To
date, administrative integration of the two statutes has stopped well short of this point - its
2001]
88 UNVERSI7Y OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 9:67
M. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE CAPITAL FORMATION SYSTEM -
COMPANY REGISTRATION
Administrative revision of securities registration continues to follow the
cyclical model, bringing the securities laws ever closer to a company-based
system, and further away from the complexities resulting from sustaining a
transaction-based system. The current public debate focuses first on whether,
and then on how, to work within the existing regulatory framework, seeking
to isolate specific areas of obsolescence, and making necessary modifications.
Arguably, the Securities Act's focus on registering transactions creates
unnecessary complexities for seasoned issuers already subject to the
Exchange Act's continuous disclosure system. Specifically, the statutory
limitations and regulatory restrictions on solicitation activities prior to and
during the registration process, and concepts such as "restricted" securities
and the integration of offerings, add confusion, uncertainty and costs to the
capital formation process, and seem designed simply to protect the integrity
of the transactional registration paradigm. 9
A. The Public Debate
Since the idea of integrating the Securities Act and the Exchange Act has
been around for over thirty years, participants in the public debate have had
ample time to come up with criticisms and praise for the concept, as well as
modifications, and, in some cases, alternatives, to company registration. Of
course, different paths to integration will have different implications for the
capital markets and its participants. 90
principal achievement being a shelf registration system under which issuers can obtain quick
access to the capital markets by incorporating by reference '34 Act filings.
Coffee, supra note 3, at 1146.
89 See Wallman, supra note 12, at 3.
90 Different paths to implementation are possible and carry very different implications. In
particular, the goals underlying a company registration system are multiple. For some, the aim
is not simply to integrate the '33 and '34 Acts, but also to integrate public and private markets
as well as to end the current system of complex and uncertain exemptions from registration
under the '33 Act. At this point, the trade-offs become more complicated...although the
compleitity surrounding affiliate resales of issuer securities can safely be reduced, the private
placement exemption has continuing value. In particular, private sales to institutional investors
might constitute a preferable vehicle by which securities of some issuers should reach the
public market, with institutional investors undertaking some of the risk-taking and due
diligence functions formerly performed by underwriters.
Coffee, supra note 3, at 1147.
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A significant contribution to the public debate came in May 1995, when
in a prescient article, authors Backman and Kim used the concept of
Securities Act metaphysics as a backdrop for a company registration proposal
that is the logical extension of integrated disclosure.9' While the Backman
and Kim proposal does not go as far as the SEC Advisory Committee Final
Report, it is a firm step in the right direction. According to Backman and
Kim, the evolution of the securities laws, with the two statutes requiring
transactional and periodic reporting, produces a metaphysical effect resulting
from a hyper-technical application of Securities Act concepts in situations
where the Exchange Act disclosure may already have fully informed the
market. 92
Backman and Kim propose the creation of a new registration system in
which certain "seasoned" issuers could register offerings on a new form of
truncated registration statement.93 The registration statement would become
effective automatically upon filing, and would, in essence, be a notification
of the potential sale of securities. Upon distribution of the securities, the
issuer would deliver a "prospectus" which would confirm the sale,
incorporating by reference virtually all other material information. Once the
offering was over, the registrant would file a form specifying the type and
amount of securities sold, and would then pay a filing fee. The authors argue
that their proposal improves on Form S-3's universal shelf registration,
because the filing fee would not be payable unless the securities were issued,
the threat of market overhang would decrease and issuers would not be
required to use underwriters in a primary equity shelf offering.
94
A major contributor to the discourse is ProfessorJohn Coffee, who has
criticized the current registration system, suggesting company registration as
a possible solution." Professor Coffee has revisited many of the ideas in the
ALI Code and in Cohen's article, updating them to take into account the
many changes since the 1960s, including the dramatic increase in the number
and importance of institutional investors, and the shift in trading from the
91 See Backman & Kim, supra note 42, at 18. In an additional bit of prescience, the authors
recommend that Congress grant the SEC express exemptive authority, along the lines of S 303(a) of the
ALl Code, allowing the SEC to exempt "any person, security, or transaction, or any class of persons,
securities, or transactions, from any or all of the provisions of this Code." See id. at 21.
9 See id.; see also McDonough, supra note 7, at 610-11.
9 The proposal eliminates traditional Securities Act registration for seasoned issuers subject to
the integrated disclosure system, eligible to use Form S-3 who met some minimal standard to ensure
.seasoning" like listing securities on an national stock exchange or NASDAQ. The proposal retains
traditional Securities Act registration for initial public offerings and certain other issuers. See Backman
& Kim, supra note 42, at 20.
94 See id.
9s See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1144.
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primary market towards the secondary market. Professor Coffee also notes
what he calls the "development and acceptance of modern finance theory,"
exemplified by the efficient capital market hypothesis, and the resulting shift
on the focus of disclosure from the individual to the market.9
Professor Coffee notes that the advantages of a company registration
system to issuers include the elimination of delays, in both the preparation
and filing of registration statements, and in the approval and declaration of
effectiveness by the SEC.' Further advantages to issuers include the
elimination of the "gun jumping" and "free writing" prohibitions of § 5 of
the Securities Act and the elimination of the absolute rescission right granted
by § 12(1), although such right may continue to exist as a matter of
marketing necessity, not statutory necessity." And finally, because of the
material differences in the liability provisions of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act, a company registration system might provide issuers with
some decrease in liability for their officers and directors due to the
inapplicability of § 11 liability.99
B. The Agency Debate
In recent years, the SEC staff began reexamining some of the basic
concepts in the Securities Act, primarily in the area of registration
96 In addition to his learned counsel on the costs and benefits of integration through company
registration, Professor Coffee also contributed an alternative proposal to company registration,
deregulating the private placement exemption. In acknowledging possible contentiousness of the public
debate on company registration, Professor Coffee sets out three "ground rules" for consideration by the
SEC in formulating any agency action on integration: (1) do not make company registration the exclusive
registration system; (2) incentivize registrants to participate by requiring enhanced disclosure
requirements on all shelf registrants, notjust company registration registrants; and (3) address the liability
question legislatively, cutting back S 11 liability to cover only initial public offerings and high risk issuers,
and restore S 12(a)(2) liability to cover sales in the private market, as well as all offering materials used by
the issuer. See id. at 1149.
Coffee goes on to discuss the best means of implementation of a company-based registration system,
a discussion made academic by the enactment of new 5S 28 and 31 of the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act, respectively. See id. at 1177-87.
9 See id. at 1155.
See id.
9 See infa notes 147-158 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ramifications ofcompany
registration on the liability landscape; see also Coffee, supra note 3, at 1156. Of course the benefits come
at a cost, in this case, because liability is the driving force behind the quality of disclosure, investors may
suffer an erosion in the quality of the disclosure provided as a result of this diminished liability. As
Professor Coffee points out, this conclusion is not inevitable. The adoption of a company registration
system could include an increase in the liability provisions under the Exchange Act, or an increase in the
character ofdue diligence attention to periodic filings undertaken by an issuer's gatekeepers: accountants,
directors, attorneys and other outside professionals. See id. at 1157.
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requirements.'to The staff's positions reflect a more literal and less flexible
and pragmatic approach to applying the Securities Act.'01 This arguably has
fueled the public debate on company registration, the ultimate integration of
the Securities Act and Exchange Act. Components of the agency debate
include an article by a high-ranking SEC official,'O° an internal task force set
up by the SEC'03 and an external advisory committee, the latter two issuing
reports proposing a company based registration system.
In February 1995, the SEC established the Advisory Committee on the
Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes ("SEC Advisory Committee")'"
too See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1153-55.
l0t See Stanley Keller, Basic Securities Concepts Revisited, 9 INSIGHTS 5 (May 1995).
10 Linda Quinn, then director of the Division of Corporation Finance at the SEC, addressed the
ABA's Federal Regulation of Securities Committee in the fall of 1995, presenting "a conceptual
framework for identifying the problems posed by the Securities Act for these market developments and
for developing and evaluating reforms to be undertaken." Her "four part approach" consisted of (i)
focusing on the nature of the purchaser as one of the factors considered in defining the regulation of
registered offerings; (ii) reconsidering requiring that offers be registered; (iii) reconsidering restrictions
on written communications, allowing communications other than statutory prospectuses during the
offering period; and (iv) reconsider prospectus delivery requirements: allowing prospectus delivery by
incorporation by reference to the full prospectus, where appropriate, and pre-confirmation physical
delivery of prospectuses in all other cases. See Quinn, supra note 17, at 26.
Ms. Quinn points out the voluntary aspect to' Securities Act registration; issuers can choose to
register offerings that would qualify as private placements and thus give their purchasers freely transferable
securities, and this registration is, in essence, for the benefit of subsequent purchasers. See id. at 25.
According to Ms. Quinn, while requiring offers to be registered assures that information about the
issuer is publicly available when the solicitations are made, exempting offers from registration would
introduce significantly more flexibility and efficiency into the process. An offer would not be a S 5 event,
and thus would not give rise to S 12(1) liability, but would still be subject to the anti fraud provisions, and
in the case of public offerings, to S 12(2) liability. See id. at 26-27.
103 SEC Chairman Levitt organized the Task Force on Disclosure Simplification, an internal SEC
task force, in August, 1995. The Task Force met over a seven month period with issuers, investors groups,
underwriters, accountants, lawyers and others who participate daily in the capital markets.. Their task was,
among other things, to review forms and rules relating to capital-raising transactions. Specifically, the SEC
Advisory Committee's objective was:
[T]o assist the Commission in evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of the regulatory
process and the disclosure requirements relating to public offerings of securities, secondary
market trading and corporate reporting, and in identify/ing and developing means to minimize
costs imposed by current regulatory programs, from the perspective of investors, issuers, the
various market participants, and other interested persons and regulatory authorities.
Charter of the Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and
Regulatory Processes (February 24, 1995, renewed February 21, 1996) at
http'//www.sec.gov/news/studies/capforr/capffuli.txt (last visited Feb. 28,2001).
104 The SEC Advisory Committee consisted of Commissioner Steven M.H. Wallman, John C.
Coffee, Jr., Barber B. Conable, Jr., Robert K Elliot, Edward F. Greene, George N. Hatsopolous, A. Bart
Holaday, Paul Kolton, Roland M. Machold, Burton G. Malkiel, Claudine Malone, Charles Miller, Karen
M. O'Brien, and Lawrence W. Sonsini. See Securities Acts Concepts and Their Effects on Capital
Formation, Securities Act Release No. 33-7314,61 Fed. Reg. 40,044 at 40,044 n.7 (July 31, 1996).
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to advise it regarding "informational needs of investors and regulatory costs
imposed on the U.S. securities markets."'O' In the course of its work, the
SEC Advisory Committee identified various regulatory uncertainties,
complexities and anomalies in the existing system, stemming primarily from
efforts to adapt to current market developments, that it believed would
ultimately impact the system's ability to protect investors."°6
The SEC Advisory Committee determined that the current procedures
under the Securities Act were well suited to initial public offerings of
securities, but not as well suited to issuances of securities by public
companies currently filing reports under the Exchange Act.1°0 Accordingly,
in its final report to the SEC, the SEC Advisory Committee proposed
adopting company registration,' °s unanimously recommending that the SEC
"act promptly both to strengthen existing investor safeguards and to reduce
the costs of corporate capital formation in the United States by establishing
a company registration system."'O'
105 See Charter of the Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on the Capital
Formation and Regulatory Processes (February 24, 1995, renewed February 21, 1996) at
httpV/www.sec.gov/news/studie/capfomVcapffull.txt (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
106 See Transmittal Letter for the Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Capital
Formation and Regulatory Processes Uuly 24, 1996) at httpV'/www.sec.gov/news/studis/capform
/capffull.txt (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
IM See SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, at i-ii.
'0 Company registration would further the traditional goals of the disclosure requirements
under the federal securities laws - to provide investors with the information necessary to make
an informed decision and to deter fraud and overreaching. While company registration would
maintain and in some cases expand the level of information about companies and their
offerings that currently is made available to the markets through Commission filings, such
information would be required to be made public earlier than under the current system,
thereby benefiting investors in both the primary issuance market and the secondary trading
markets. At the same time, company registration would afford companies offering their
securities to the public the flexibility to tailor the disclosure documents delivered to investors
to the nature of the transaction and the demands of the offering participants. Company
registration also would maintain and reinforce the roles of outside gatekeepers and monitors
and their due diligence functions in fostering the reliability of that information to meet the
realities of today's markets.
SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, app. B.
109 See Transmittal Letter for Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation
and Regulatory Processes, supra note 106.
The Committee believes that the cumulative effect of the evolutionary changes in the markets
since the 1930s now require a reassessment of the conceptual underpinnings of the regulatory
process, as opposed to continued incremental changes. Company registration is consistent
with the evolutionary approach of incremental liberalization, but it is also, unmistakably, a new
departure. Unlike incrementalism, it says with finality that registration should not take
precedence over periodic disclosure for companies that are already traded. It recognizes and
addresses what was not yet apparent in the early 1930s: the economic importance of traded
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Under company registration as proposed by the SEC Advisory
Committee ("SEC Advisory Committee Proposal")," to become "company-
registered," eligible companies would file a Form C-1 registration statement
"disclosing plans to make offerings from time to time on a company-
registered basis and registering all sales of all securities.""' The Form C-1
would be kept current by incorporating all existing and future Exchange Act
filings therein."2 The Form C-1 would contain a generic description of the
types of securities the issuer was contemplating issuing, and a general
discussion of the issuer's financing plans."3 Thus the Form C-1 would not
be a single document, but rather a composite of the initial C-1, plus all
Exchange Act filings incorporated in by reference as well as any post-effective
amendments thereto." 4 A "pay as you go" system for fees would result from
the nominal fee paid upon filing, with an undertaking to pay a fee upon each
sale of security under the Form C-1.11
5
Under company registration, all purchasers of securities from the issuer
or its affiliates would receive freely transferable securities, regardless of the
nature of the transaction." 6 Likewise, they would benefit from all of the
statutory remedies connected with the dissemination of information in a
companies raising additional capital by issuing securities. Thus company registration is far
more than a cost-reduction and efficiency reform. It is a new beginning for the registration
process, and it is overdue. The shift to a company registration system thus would change the
way we think about the regulation of the capital formation process and foster a fresh approach
to addressing the various problems. This more comprehensive conceptual approach would
address both the interests of seasoned issuers in today's fast-moving markets and offering
processes for investors, underwriters, and other participants.
SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, at 51-52.
110 Under the SEC Advisory Committee Final Report:
Registration is company, not transaction-based (except IPOs and other specific transactions).
Once meeting eligibility standards, companies register with the SEC and file periodic reports.
Routine financings, as well as resales by affiliates and resales of what are currently known as
restricted securities, could be consummated without the current SEC review and registration
process. Information provided to investors in the marketingofthese routine financings would
be based on what the market demands and on companyand transactional information required
to be filed as part of the issuer's periodic reports. The principal distinctions currently existing
between public and nonpublic offerings by registered companies (with the resulting formalities
and restrictive concepts such as gun-jumping and integration) would be eliminated, because
offers and sales by companies already registered with the SEC generally would not be subject
to additional transactional registration requirements.
SEC Advisory Committee Term Sheet, supra note 22, at 1.
II See SEC Advisory Term Sheet, supra note 22, at 2.
112 See SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, at 7.
10 See id.
114 See id.
115 See id. at 8.
116 See id. at 9.
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registered offering.' 17 Accordingly, investor protection would be preserved
and in fact, extended to a broader class of transactions, while eliminating
unnecessary concepts like gun-jumping, and restricted securities." 8
The goals of the SEC Advisory Committee Proposal are to:
* improve the protection of investors in the primary offering
market;
* reduce the cost of capital formation, eliminate unnecessary
regulatory costs and uncertainties that currently impede a
company's access to the capital markets, and streamline and
simplify the process of raising capital;
* enhance the disclosure provided to investors in the secondary
trading markets on an ongoing basis, not just when the issuer
determines to conduct a public offering; and
* eliminate complexities arising from the need to distinguish
between public and private, domestic and offshore, and issuer
and non-issuer transactions 19
Within these goals are echoes of the themes of the last thirty years of
public debate, from Cohen, to the ALI Code, to Coffee. Throughout the
debate, some have questioned whether the current registration requirements
establish unnecessary obstacles to capital formation, without any
compensating benefits to investors, especially with respect to complex
concepts like "restricted" securities, integration of offerings and limitations
on general solicitation, all of which arguably exist to protect the core
paradigm of transaction registration." The SEC Advisory Committee
Proposal answers many of these questions, facilitating access to capital
markets, easing the complex and technical regulatory concepts, and
increasing the amount and quality of disclosure provided to investors.' Of
117 See id.
119 SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, at 1-2.
120 See Waillman, supra note 12, at 3.
121 At least one commentator argues that the company registration system Milton Cohen
envisioned is, in substance, "already largely in place within the present securities regulatory framework."
See Choi, supra note 2, at 569. Professor Choi instead argues that reform within the current regulatory
framework, specifically the institution of a status-based anti-fraud liability standard, would more easily
achieve the goals of the SEC Advisory Committee's proposals. See id. at 571. "Moving toward a status-
based antifraud regime, moreover, would leave most of the current system's existing framework in place,
avoiding the confusion inherent in shifting to a completely new regulatory paradigm." Id. at 572.
According to Professor Choi:
The Advisory Committee's recommendations, although appealing on a theoretical level, are
largely peripheral to creating a company registration system. The Article supports this
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course not everyone agrees with the SEC Advisory Committee's
recommendations.'2
Company registration would streamline the process of accessing the
capital markets. The offering process would be simplified since offerings
could be tied to the issuer's need for capital, not to the regulatory
environment. Additionally, market considerations, not regulatory concerns,
would govern an issuer's timetable because eliminating the preparation and
filing ofa Securities Act registration statement, as well as eliminating the wait
for SEC approval and declaration of effectiveness, would diminish delay,
cost and uncertainty to the process.23 Issuers would have more flexibility to
proposition by demonstrating that reforms instituted during the 1980s already introduced most
of the substantive benefits of a company registration system within the Securities Act.
Furthermore, those Advisory Committee recommendations that more directly introduce a
pure company registration system are both unsuitable for non-S-3 companies and provide only
incremental substantive changes to the current regime . . . status-based antifraud and
company registration reform. . . achieve(s] at a lower cost many ofthe incremental benefits
that company registration provides for the current system.
Id. at 573.
The three SEC Advisory Committee members, writing a separate statement to the Final Report of
the Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes, also focus on liability
concerns, but according to Professor Choi, their focus is almost entirely centered on clarifying the due
diligence requirements gatekeepers like underwriters, outside directors and accountants. See Choi, supra,
note 2, at 651 n.21; see also SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, at 53 (Separate
Statement ofJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Edward F. Greene, and Lawrence W. Sonsini).
According to Professor Choi,
[Tjthe level ofantifraud liability for primary issuer transactions should turn on the status of
the issuer and not on the type of transaction.. .where the issuer is a Form S-1 company,
possessing little market experience and few market-based deterrents against fraud, it should
be subject to the most stringent level ofantifraud liability regardless of the type of transaction
it undertakes. Conversely, Form S-2 and S-3 issuers, who are presumptively better followed
and more highly capitalized, should face lower levels ofantifraud liability.
Choi, supra note 2, at 572-73.
12, The SEC Advisory Committee Final Report "presents a curious mixture of proposals directly
related to creating a company registration system and other proposals not necessarily dependent on
company registration." See Choi, supra note 2 at 616.
123 See SEC Advisory Committee Term Sheet, supra note 22, at 19.
At its heart, the Advisory Committee's proposed company registration system establishes a
form of continuous shelf registration system. Companies entering the company registration
system are required to file a new Form C-I with the SEC containing "a generic description
of the type of securities the issuer anticipated issuing, as well as a general discussion of its
financing plans." After the initial filing ofForm C-1, the information in the Form C-1 would
be kept current by incorporating all existing Exchange Act filings, including Form 10-K, 10-Q,
and 8-K filings. The continuous registration statement for Section 5 and Section II purposes
then consists of the original Form C-1 and all incorporated documents.
Choi, supra note 2, at 616.
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go to the market more often, for lesser amounts, because of the lower
transaction cost and the decrease in time delays.
2 4
Company registration would further the stated goals of the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act"z by providing investors with information necessary
to make informed decisions and to deter both fraud and overreaching on the
part of issuers.
126
Issuers would have greater flexibility in determining the nature of their
marketing efforts since the timing and content of prospectuses would be
driven by marketing considerations (subject to the anti-fraud provisions),
instead of by SEC rule." The SEC Advisory Committee Proposal divides
transactions into three levels, routine, 128 non-routine29 and extraordinary,
130
The two main benefits claimed by the Advisory Committee over today's shelf registration
under Rule 415 are that: "The current limitations of the shelf registration system on the
amount of securities that could be registered would be eliminated, as would the need to file
a new registration statement to register additional securities." Rule 415 currently allows S-3
companies to register only up to 10 percent of a company's outstanding voting equity for "at
the market" offerings; furthermore, the company must reasonably expect to issue its shelf-
registered equity within two years of its registration.
Id. at 651 n.179, (quoting SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, at 9; Rule 415,17 C.F.R.
S 230.415)(1999)).
12 See SEC Advisory Committee Term Sheet, supra note 22, at 19-20.
1' See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
126 While company registration would maintain and in some cases expand the level of
information about companies and their offerings that currently is made available to the markets
through Commission filings, such information would be required to be made public earlier
than under the current system, thereby benefiting investors in both the primary issuance
market and the secondary trading markets. At the same time, company registration would
afford companies offering their securities to the public the flexibility to tailor the disclosure
documents delivered to investors to the nature of the transaction and the demands of the
offering participants. Company registration also would maintain and reinforce the roles of
outside gatekeepers and monitors and their due diligence functions in fostering the reliability
of that information to meet the realities of today's markets.
SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, app. B.
127 See id. "Delivery of the transactional information could be accomplished either by
incorporation by reference or by actual delivery, depending on the size of the offering and other factors.
The prospectus would not be subject to prior staff review except in the case of'extraordinary' securities
transactions." Id.; see also Coffee, supra note 3, at 1155.
128 Under the Term Sheet for the Pilot Company Registration Program "routine" transactions are
deemed to fall within Tier One:
In "routine" transactions, an issuer could incorporate information in the Form C-1
registration statement and filed reports, including the transactional information filed on a
Form 8-K, into a document serving as the prospectus, such as the confirmation or selling
materials, that is then distributed to investors, thereby satisfying in any of these cases the
prospectus delivery requirements.
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and determines the need for prospectuses as a function of the informational
needs of the investors, not the need to prepare and deliver after-the-fact
compliance documents determined by the SEC.13 1
Under company registration, transactional information would still need
to be physically delivered as part of the prospectus when delivery of such
information arguably might serve to facilitate an investor's evaluation of the
issuer or the security offered. 3 2 But if such delivery is not necessary in order
to facilitate the investor's evaluation, and where the information has already
been disclosed to the markets through a public filing made with the SEC,
company registration provides the flexibility for issuers to file the
information with the SEC without physical delivery to investors.' 33
Company registration would also ease some of the complex and technical
regulatory concepts that can delay or block access to the capital markets.' 34
The need to differentiate between freely transferable securities issued
pursuant to a registration statement and "restricted" securities issued in some
exempt transactions would, in most cases, disappear, alongwith the concepts
of "integration" and "general solicitation," providing liquidity benefits to
Any material company developments to be incorporated must be filed on the Form 8-K
a reasonable time prior to the dissemination of the prospectus incorporating the information
(e.g., one to three business days) to provide the market an opportunity to absorb the
information. Otherwise, as today, the information must be delivered physically as part of the
formal prospectus, which is filed simultaneously with the Commission.
SEC Advisory Committee Term Sheet, supra note 22, at 5-6.
t29 Under the Term Sheet for the Pilot Company Registration Program "non routine" transactions
are deemed to fall within Tier Two and consist of "any single transaction increasing, or potentially
increasing, the issuer's outstanding voting securities by more than 20%." Id.
In "non routine" transactions, the issuer would be required to prepare and deliver a formal
prospectus containing transactional and, where appropriate to update disclosures, company
information. The prospectus would be filed (in addition to or as part of the mandated Form
8-K in non-de minimus equity offerings) with, but would not be subject to registration or
prior review by, the SEC. Information previously provided in selling materials need not be
redelivered.
Id. at 6.
130 Under the Term Sheet for the Pilot Company Registration Program "extraordinary"
transactions are deemed to fall within Tier Three and include "any financing, merger, material acquisition
or other restructuring transaction involving a company's issuance of securities that results in an increase,
or potential increase, of at least 40% of the outstanding voting share." Id. at 6-7. "In 'extraordinary'
transactions, a post-effective amendment to the Form C-1 would be required and would be subject to
SEC staffreview of the transactional information. The same prospectus delivery requirements as in Tier
Two transactions would apply." Id.
01 See Coffee, supra note 5, at 1155.
132 See SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, app. B.
133 See id.
134 See SEC Advisory Committee Term Sheet, supra note 22,19-20.
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investors for what would otherwise be privately placed securities. 3 These
constructs arguably have developed over the years in an effort to maintain the
separation of the public and private markets, which are less necessary under
company registration. 36 The approach the SEC selects to implement the
program will influence its success in eliminating these complexities.'37
Under the SEC Advisory Committee Proposal, the transition to
company registration would be accomplished by a pilot program, available
only to larger, more seasoned issuers with specified minimum public floats
and reporting histories, reducing the number of possible participants to thirty
percent of public companies, who will serve as a test of the logistics of the
program before it is opened up to all issuers.3 The SEC Advisory
Committee recommended that based on the experience with the pilot, the
SEC could then decide what additional conditions or modifications need be
made to the program.
39
The SEC Advisory Committee Proposal contains a provision called
company "lite," under which issuers could elect a modified company
registration that would continue to permit private placements of any of its
securities, including equity securities, as well as reliance on other
transactional exemptions, as long as such issuers undertook to adopt the
enhanced disclosure practices." This arguably political accommodation will
US See Wallman, supra note 12, at 3.
13 See SEC Advisory Committee Term Sheet, supra note 22, at 20.
13 See infra notes 138-142 and accompanying text for a description of the SEC Advisory
Committee's proposed method for implementing company registration.
08 According to the SEC Advisory Committee:
The Committee determined that a pilot company registration program would be the most
appropriate way to begin the transition. The pilot would be available initially only to issuers
that meet certain criteria, such as having a specified minimum public float and reporting
history. Because these issuers generally are more sophisticated with respect to financial
reporting and other disclosure requirements and are more widely followed by the markets, the
Committee concluded that permitting these types of issuers to opt into the pilot program
would provide the best test ofthe advantages of the company registration system as compared
to the current system.
SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, at iv, 41; see also SEC Advisory Committee Term
Sheet, supra note 22, at 9.
U9 See SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, at iv.
14 With modified company registration, or company "lite," as long as the issuer complies with the
enhanced disclosure practices, the issuer would have the benefit of the "pay as you go" registration process
for its public offerings. Exempt sales would not be integrated with registered sales made under the
company registration system. But the privately placed securities would be restricted.
The modified company registration allows issuers to evaluate the benefits of registration of all
equity sales against the benefits of a continued private placement exemption, including the absence of S
11 liability for sales under the private placement exemption. See SEC Advisory Committee Term Sheet,
supra note 22, at 12-13.
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serve to encourage issuers to participate in the pilot program. The SEC
Advisory Committee believed that, despite the added complexities stemming
from company "lite," the provision was necessary as an incentive to get
issuers to participate at all, allowing them time to become comfortable with
the concept of company registration.14 ' However, the drawback to the
flexibility of offering a company "lite" option is that if the program is
voluntary, and some eligible issuers elect not to participate, the potential
benefits of the concept of company registration from eliminating such
complexities as restricted securities might not be fully realized.'
42
Company registration should improve the quality of disclosure provided
by issuers to both the primary and secondary trading markets. 143 Historically,
the quality of disclosure under the Securities Act has exceeded that of the
Exchange Act.' 44 The required disclosure enhancements, including the
141 See SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, at 34-35.
142 Hopefully, the market will drive issuers to the most efficient option.
The incentives to opt into a company registration system are uncertain and limited. Some
companies may prefer to rely on the existing shelf registration system. In our judgment, it is
unwise to have two parallel systems, one carrying the obligation to file a mandatory Form 8-K
at the time of a substantial equity issuance plus requirements for certification by top
management and the preparation of a senior management report; and the other, not. Any
disparity between company registration and shelf registration that requires mandatory filings,
certifications, and reports under the former (but not the latter) will create an unfortunate and
powerful incentive for issuers to opt to remain within the existing shelf registration system.
Thus, we would urge the Commission to adopt similar requirements with respect to the
existing shelf registration system.
SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, at 54 (Separate Statement ofJohn C. Coffee, Jr.,
Edward F. Greene, and Lawrence W. Sonsini).
The Committee's approach is similar in effect but different in concept from the way the SEC
adopted shelf registration, adopting the rle on a temporary basis to give issuers and market participants
a chance to further comment on the program, while itself gathering data to help it assess the success of
the program.
143 At least for companies in an efficient market, one of the greatest advantages of a company
registration system is its elimination of the need to register repeatedly securities of the same
class. Because entire companies are registered, investors may freely purchase any security of
the registered company; rather than becoming a focal point for regulation and disclosure,
primary transactions simply are treated as any other major information event... [But] as the
cost ofonducting repeated registrations ofsecurities diminishes - through shelfofferings, for
example - this advantage of formal company registration diminishes. Likewise, a true
company registration system would similarly restrict the trading of securities of lightly
followed companies with little public information regardless of the path the securities took to
market. The Advisory Committee, however, does not examine this possibility, instead
focusing exclusively on the implications of company registration for companies trading in an
efficient market only.
Choi, supra note 2, at 608.
144 The expense ofcontinuous due diligence of the caliber expected in primary distribution,
coupled with the issuers' legitimate need to control the timing of public disclosure of material
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formation of disclosure committees, enhanced involvement by senior
management, and improvements in the content and timeliness of Exchange
Act reporting, should result in more careful due diligence practices, raising
the level of all corporate disclosure.
145
As is the case with any proposed solutions to complex problems, the
"solution" of company registration remedies some problems, and arguably
generates some of its own, such as the appropriate standard of liability and
the ability of underwriters to undertake meaningful due diligence.'14
Company registration would affect the current liability landscape, 47 which
itself has undergone changes in recent years."' The Supreme Court decision
developments, make it difficult for Exchange Act documents always to achieve true parity in
terms ofreliability and currency with documents filed in connection with registered offerings.
However, the Committee believes that additional improvements in Exchange Act disclosure-
especially with respect to the attention paid by senior management, outside directors and other
gatekeepers or monitors- would achieve more fully the intent of the Commission when it
integrated the disclosure requirements of the two statutes in 1982.
SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, at 67-68.
145 According to the SEC Advisory Committee, "complementing measures to ease issuer access
to the market would be measures to improve the level and reliability of secondary market disclosures."
See SEC Advisory Committee Term Sheet, supra note 22, at 13.
The disclosure enhancements include (a) certification to the SEC by two of the following four
officers: CEO, COO, CFO or CAO, certifying that they have reviewed the Exchange Act filings and are
not aware of any misleading disclosures or omissions; (b) reports prepared by management and submitted
to the audit committee, describing the procedures used to ensure the integrity of the Exchange Act filings,
and describing procedures instituted to avoid insider trading, (c) expanded reporting obligations under
Form 8-K for disclosures of items previously required to be filed quarterly, and under company
registration, must be filed on a current basis; (d) risk factor analysis disclosure requirements required in
Securities Act filings would be added to Form 10-K See SEC Advisory Committee Term Sheet, supra note
22, at 14.
146 Requiring Securities Act-type due diligence on Exchange Act filings will be vastly more
expensive for the issuers.
147 This approach does not represent a change in the liability system for public offerings
(with the exception of sales by persons who would no longer be subject to resale restrictions
and thus who would not have liability under Section 11 for their resales), but represents an
expansion of liability to the extent transactions that would otherwise be exempt private
placement or flowbacks from overseas placements are covered by the Form C-1. In addition,
because in many offerings the transactional information will be filed on Form 8-K and made
part of the registration statement, rather than merely part of a prospectus supplement as is the
practice in shelf offerings today, Section 11 will apply to that disclosure when it has not been
applicable under the current scheme.
SEC Advisory Committee Term Sheet, supra note 22, at 16.
148 "The Supreme Court has partially reaffirmed this conclusion by refusing to extend the strict
and vicarious liability provisions of the 1933 Act to private placements, a fast-growing method for issuers
to bypass traditional 1933 Act registration." McDonough, supra note 7, at 563 n.9 (citing Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 61, 64 (1995)).
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in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc.,' holding that the negligence standard of
§ 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act applies only to public offerings, arguably
weakens the Securities Act disclosure scheme. At the same time it provides
the basis to strengthen the Exchange Act disclosure schemes, through the
mechanism of company registration.50
Company registration "will preserve the current statutory liability
provisions, in that § 11 will continue to be applied in a manner similar to its
current application."15' Issuers, officers, directors, experts and underwriters
would be vulnerable to § 11 liability for false or misleading statements in the
Form C-1, including all the information incorporated by reference from the
Exchange Act filings.' 2 Of course, defendants other than issuers would still
be able to avail themselves of the due diligence defense. 53 In addition,
company registration will expand the coverage of S 11 to transactions that are
currently undertaken without registration, such as private placements and
offshore offerings."s
Company registration will decrease liability exposure for some issuers,
through the elimination of the S 12(a)(1) absolute right of rescission for an
investor who did not receive a prospectus prior to the mailing of the
confirmation or delivery of shares. But issuers that might otherwise have
offered securities through a private placement, when making a public
offering under company registration, would become subject to S 11 and
5 12 (a)(2) liability.'55
Under the shelf registration system, issuers who provide transactional
disclosure through a prospectus supplement rather than a filing included in
a registration statement, deny their investors the protection of S 11 with
respect to such disclosures. Some commentators argue that seasoned issuers
149 513 U.S. 61 (1995).
ISO See Margaret A. Bancroft, Responding to Gustafson: Company Registration and a New Negligence
Standard, 9 INSIGHTS 14 Uul. 1995).
tsl See SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, app. B.
1s2 The issuer would be subject to strict Section 11 liability to purchasers of securities sold
under the company registration statement for materially false or misleading information in the
Form C-I (including all incorporated information such as transactional information filed as
part of the Form 8-K). Officers, directors, experts and underwriters likewise would be liable
for materially false and misleading statements in the Form C-I (including transactional and
updating information filed on the Form 8-K and incorporated into the Form C-1) and any
post-effective amendments thereto (with due diligence defenses afforded under current law).
SEC Advisory Committee Term Sheet, supra note 22, at 16; see also SEC Advisory Committee Final
Report, supra note 10, app. B.
153 See SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, app. B.
134 See id. at 86.
Iss See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1156, for a discussion of the reduction in liability exposure for
issuers and their officers and directors under company registration.
2001]
102 UNIVERSI7Y OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 9:67
that could raise capital in reliance on their Exchange Act filings, without
registration under the Securities Act, should be held to some new Exchange
Act negligence standard.'" This is unnecessary under company registration,
because the pilot program requires that transactional information disclosed
in a Form 8-K must be incorporated into the registration statement and
therefore would come within the coverage of § 11.
The SEC Advisory Committee considered several alternative liability
schemes" 7 but ultimately advised retaining the current liability scheme, at
"S' Any new negligence standard needs to strike a balance between investor protection and
company protection from strike suits and frivolous litigation. One means of striking a balance
would be to provide a safe harbor to those registrants who engage independent accountants
and law firms to actively review, comment on, and revise key Exchange Act documents,
including 10K's and 10Q's, in advance of their filing. The point of the active, participatory
auditor/lawyer review would be to replicate, to the extent practical, the valuable, critical review
process associated with long-form Securities Act filings.
Because company registration reflects the ultimate ascendancy ofExchange Act disclosure
over that of the Securities Act, it should incorporate some of the rigor ofthe Securities Act in
policing disclosure. Therefore, company registration should be offered to issuers only on the
condition that they agree to be governed by a new negligence standard for Exchange Act filed
documents that replaces the dead letter of Section 18 of that Act. This would strengthen the
federal disclosure system as it relates to both the trading and the capital raising markets. The
new negligence standard could be modeled on the Section 12(2) formulation of negligence,
with appropriate modifications designed to recognize that the new standard would provide a
civil remedy for purchasers of a company's securities in the open market, as well as in capital
raisings. For example, as is the case with the American Law Institute's Federal Securities
Code, a cap could be placed on the maximum liability of any defendant.
Bancroft, supra note 150, at 15-16.
The approach taken by the SEC, should it adopt company registration, also bears on the liability
issue. If company registration is optional, issuers could essentially opt out of a new liability standard by
registering under the Securities Act:
[A]nd investors, given the choice of accepting privately placed shares policed solely by Rule
10b-S's fraud remedy or company registered shares policed by a negligence standard, might
very well help issuers decide that company registration was a viable option by demanding
premiums for privately placed securities. In addition, greater public confidence in the integrity
of Exchange Act filings could favorably affect the trading price of securities of companies that
choose company registration. Ironically, Gustafson which weakens the SecuritiesAct disclosure
system may serve as the force that finally puts the Exchange Act at the center of federal
securities regulation.
Id. at 15-16.
157 The SEC Advisory Committee considered (i) issuers would incur S 11 liability on for initial
public offerings and extraordinary distributions, and S 12(a)(2) liability for routine transactions; (ii)
extending S 11 and 12(a)(2) remedies to all purchasers in primary offerings and in secondary market
transactions contemporaneous with the offering, limiting the issuers total liability to the lesser of the
offering proceeds or the damage caused, with the awarded damages prorated among investors in the
primary and secondary markets; (iii) eliminating S 11 liability and extending S 12(a)(2) liability to all
statements made by the issuer, regardless of whether the issuer was selling securities or if its securities
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least for the pilot phase of the program, "to maintain important investor
protections while achieving the objectives of company registration," with the
proviso that relevant parties be given additional guidance on the factors
relevant to establishing a due diligence defense under § 11 and S 12(a)(2). Is8
A related concern arising out of company registration stems from the
ability of underwriters to undertake due diligence. This concern was raised
in connection with shelf registrations by Commissioner Thomas in her
dissent to the adoption of Rule 415, and is still a part of the debate." 9
Company registration will also increase the effectiveness and quality of due
diligence.' 6
With the accelerated timing of offerings under company registration, the
underwriters may be selected very near the time of sale and therefore have
little or no time to complete any meaningful due diligence. The SEC
Advisory Committee declined to recommend limiting liability for
gatekeepers and monitors, and instead recommended providing more
guidance, within Rule 176, to elaborate on what constitutes "reasonable
investigation" and/or "reasonable care" for purposes of the due diligence
defense in § 11 and 12(a)(2) under company registration. 61  The
underwriting community will likely not be greatly comforted by this
approach, seeking instead to have its liability reduced.
C. The Agency Proposal
After receiving the report of the SEC Advisory Committee, the SEC
published a concept release seeking comment on possible reforms to further
its investor protection mandate and to reform the current regulation of the
were trading in the secondary market; (iv) limiting liability for a registered company's routine financings
to Rule 10b-5 liability only. See SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, at 88.
I" See SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, at 87.
159 See Examination of the Registration of Securities to be Offered and Sold on a Delayed or
Continuous Basis in the Future, Securities Release No. 33-6391, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,701 (Mar. 18,
1982)(Commissioner Thomas dissent). But see Barbara Ann Banoff, RegulatorySubsidies, Effident Markets,
and Shef Registration: An Analyris of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REv. 135 (Mar. 1984)(arguing that the
improvements in information getting to the market through the underwriters' due diligence does not
really benefit investors, obviating the need for due diligence); Merritt B. Fox, ShefRegistration, Integrated
Disclosure, and UnderiterDue Diligence:An EconomicAnalysis, 70 VA. L. REv. 1005 (Jun. 1984) (for a defense
of the information improvement resulting from due diligence); American Bar Association Committee
on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Sellers' Due Diligence and Similar
Defenses Under Federal Securities Law, 48 Bus. LAW. 1185 (May 1993).
Ito See SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, app. B.
161 See SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, at 96.
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capital formation process."~ The SEC undertook to consider public
comment on the recommendations in the SEC Advisory Committee
Proposal, and other ideas in the release before taking any agency action.
13
D. The Renewed Public Debate
The SEC received over sixty comment letters, covering a range of issues
from timing considerations, feasibility of disclosure enhancements and
concerns about liability and due diligence issues. 4 The SEC has yet to act
on the proposal or comments thereto.
The concept of company registration put forth in Cohen's article has
been refined and developed through public and agency debate over the last
thirty years, with renewed interest beginning in the mid-1990s. The prior
debates on the complete integration of the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act have contributed to, if not actually precipitated, the SEC's adoption of
the integrated disclosure system, and the shelf registration process. The
renewed public debate on the company registration proposal will no doubt
have an impact on any agency action and its aftermath. But the debate is far
from over, and, as it continues, it will likely focus substantively on the
appropriate liability standards, and practical resolutions to the due diligence
timing issues, and, procedurally, on the wisdom and practicality of a
voluntary program." This debate will lay the groundwork for additional
162 See Securities Act Concepts and Their Effects on Capital Formation, Securities Release No.
33-7314,61 Fed. Reg. 40,044,40,044-45 (Jul. 25, 1996).
163 See id.
I(A The comment letters addressed both the SEC Advisory Committee Final Report and other
components of the public and agency debate. Nine of the comment letters dealt simply with mechanics,
such as requests to extend the comment period. Eight of the fourteen SEC Advisory Committee
members submitted comments, primarily in the form of transcripts of their testimony before the SEC.
Other commenters included lawyers and bar associations, accounting firms, investment banks and
securities trade institutions and corporations. See Dominic Bencivenga, '33 Securities Act at 64; Update
Seen Needed, But How Far Should It Go? N.Y.LJ., Feb. 20, 1997, at 5.
16 "Progress toward company registration is possible, and the time is ripe. Much of the debate,
however, necessarily will focus more on the means than on the ends." Coffee, supra note 12, at B4.
Ifa company is registered and reporting under the Exchange Act, there should not be the
impediment to a registered or unregistered offering that S 5 creates. The Wallman Committee
has suggested that company registration should be the statutory goal, but pending proposals
of the Wallman Committee will not solve the problems encountered by small and mid-size
companies.
Although new registration forms are being developed to accomplish company
registration, as opposed to securities registration, these new forms will be for seasoned issuers
only. Further, a company will have to opt into the new scheme and voluntarily agree to several
enhancements to current disclosure practices .... The objective of these enhancements will
be to enhance the integrity, but not the scope of disclosure. Yet, it is not clear what the cost
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agency action and public debate thereon.' 66
IV. CONCLUSION
Company registration is the logical culmination of years of public
debates, agency debates, agency proposals and agency actions that began with
the unfortunate enactment of two separate statutes, resulting in duplicative
and onerous disclosure obligations. These debates, proposals and actions
have taken the securities laws through the adoption of the integrated
disclosure system and the adoption of the streamlined shelf registration
process. Although a proposal such as company registration could be seen as
an abandonment of the current system, a better explanation is that company
registration is a sensible next step, flowing logically from the prior debate,
and from the continued lack of statutory integration and the conflict
resulting therefrom.
The SEC has the statutory authority to continue these trends, by shifting
our current system of registering securities away from a transaction-based
system and towards a company-based system. The SEC Advisory Committee
generated a viable blueprint towards this goal with their Final Report in 1996.
or liability implications of these enhancements would be .... Nevertheless, the current system
is a regulatory tax on capital formation in increasingly competitive international capital
markets. While investor protection against fraud is clearly necessary to preserve investor
confidence and to create a healthy climate for capital formation, modem communications and
technology should make it possible for both private placements and underwritings to proceed
in a less cumbersome way than under current S 5 law and regulation.
Karmel, supra note 7, at 3.
t66 To the extent that the SEC pursues a voluntary company registration model
administratively, it must avoid the danger of allowing the costs associated with this option to
exceed its benefits. A model that is exclusive - that is, that denies those electing it the ability
to use private placements or Regulation S for equity sales - has real costs compared with less
certain benefits. Not surprisingly, then, there are already signs that the principal constituencies
affected by SEC actions are uncertain to skeptical about the benefits of company registration.
Underwriters fear it will lead to further erosion in due diligence and their gatekeeper role,
while issuers do not like the obligation to register sales by affiliates and the "flow back" from
foreign offerings, plus the risk of Section 11 liability. To be sure, these expressed reservations
may partially mask other concerns; for example, underwriters may fear loss of their special
relationships to the traditional issuer clients and dislike increased competition, while issuers
may simply want additional "sweeteners." Nonetheless, they suggest the need to rethink the
process of administrative implementation.
Coffee, supra note 3, at 1185-86.
Professor Coffee made three final recommendations: (1) the SEC should avoid exclusivity, making
company registration one of several options; (2) the costs ofcompany registration should be taxed to shelf
registrations and not to the use of some new universal shelf registration statement; and (3) issues of
liability should be addressed legislatively. See id. at 1186-87.
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Now is the time to start additional public debate and discourse on this
critically important issue, to bring to light any logistical problems in the SEC
Advisory Committee Proposal and pilot plan, and to generate any necessary
solutions. The SEC should have the strength and the foresight to recognize
the need for reform in the way we register securities, and to use its
rulemaking authority to move the system towards company registration.
